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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3378 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ, 
            Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-12-cr-00108-001) 
District Judge: Hon. John E. Jones III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 28, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.* 
 
(Filed: March 31, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge. 
 
  
                                                 
* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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Defendant-Appellant Michael Rodriguez pleaded guilty to a one-count 
information charging him with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 
heroin, crack cocaine, and oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania imposed a 27-month 
sentence.  In this appeal, Rodriguez argues only that the District Court improperly treated 
his juvenile adjudications as adult convictions in determining his sentence.  We will 
affirm. 
I 
 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history, which we 
recite only as needed to address the issue on appeal. 
 On April 20, 2011, the Pennsylvania State Police arrested Rodriguez after he sold 
two bricks of heroin to a confidential informant.  While on bail, in January 2012, 
Rodriguez sold crack to a confidential informant on three occasions.  In addition, the 
police had information that Rodriguez had sold a large quantity of oxycodone from 2009 
through 2011.   
 On April 25, 2012, the grand jury indicted Rodriguez on two counts of violating 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  On December 13, 2012, a one-count 
superseding information was filed charging Rodriguez with distributing and possessing, 
with intent to distribute, heroin, crack cocaine, and oxycodone, between January 1, 2011 
through January 9, 2012, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
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 Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the superseding information on January 2, 2013.  The 
written plea agreement included a nonbinding agreement that the advisory guideline 
imprisonment range was 21 to 27 months before adjusting for acceptance of 
responsibility.  The presentence report calculated a base level offense of 24 and a 
criminal history category of III, which generated a 63 to 78 month sentence.  Rodriguez 
objected because it was above the range set out in his plea agreement.  The District Court 
sustained that objection, which the government did not resist, and set the advisory 
guideline range at 21 to 27 months, the “precise range that was contemplated in the plea 
agreement that defendant signed.”  App. at 17. 
After hearing from Rodriguez, his counsel, and the government, the District Court 
proceeded to consider the § 3553(a) factors.  The District Court noted that Rodriguez had 
a “remarkable criminal record” that “began at age 13” and “continued over the decade 
and a half since then.  There are juvenile convictions, including one for receipt of stolen 
property, two convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 
simple assault, and two convictions for simple possession.”  Id. at 22–23 (emphasis 
added).  The District Court noted that Rodriguez had “an adult criminal record that 
includes a conviction for a fight to avoid apprehension, three convictions for possession 
of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia, [and] five convictions for driving while 
operating privileges [were] suspended for DUI related offenses.”  Id. at 23.  The court 
imposed a 27-month sentence, the high end of the guideline range.  
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Rodriguez appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in treating his juvenile 
adjudications as adult convictions at sentencing. 1 
II 
The parties assert that the abuse of discretion standard apples.  United States v. 
Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).2  We first must “‘ensure that 
the District Court committed no significant procedural error in arriving at its decision.’”  
Id. (quoting United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “If we conclude 
that a court committed no procedural error, we then review the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence.”  Id. 
III 
 The District Court inaccurately referred to Rodriguez’s juvenile adjudications as 
juvenile convictions, but this was not a reversible procedural error.  “Examples of 
procedural errors include ‘failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
                                                 
1  The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and 
we have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
2  Although the parties identify abuse of discretion as the standard, Rodriguez did 
not object during the sentencing hearing to his sentence or to the District Court’s use of 
the word “conviction” to describe the adjudication of his juvenile cases; plain error 
review applies.  However, when a District Court does not abuse its discretion, plain error 
likely does not occur.  See United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(stating that plain error review is, “if anything, even more rigorous than the abuse of 
discretion standard”).  As explained, the District Court did not commit either plain error 
or abuse its discretion at sentencing, despite its inaccurate use of the word “conviction” to 
describe the resolution of Rodriguez’s juvenile cases. 
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explain the chosen sentence.’”  Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007)). 
 Rodriguez objected to the sentencing range in the PSR, stating that he “strongly 
believe[d] that the guideline range should be 21 to 27 months” based on the plea 
agreement.  PSR Objs. at 1 (March 25, 2013).  The District Court sustained the objection 
and set the range as Rodriguez requested.  After noting Rodriguez’s juvenile record, the 
District Court discussed his “adult criminal record” and thoughtfully discussed the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  App. at 23.  The District Court imposed a sentence within the 
guideline range the parties agreed to. 
The record belies the assertion that the District Court improperly calculated the 
guidelines range or imposed a sentence based on an erroneous view of Rodriguez’s 
juvenile record.  The District Court’s misstatement was not a “significant procedural 
error.”  See Jones, 566 F.3d at 366. 
IV 
 The sentence was also substantively reasonable.  “As long as a sentence falls 
within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of 
the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.”  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.  The sentence was within 
the guideline range, and the District Court carefully explained how the § 3553(a) factors 
led him to the sentence imposed. 
 Finding no reversible error, we will affirm. 
